Social media networks have democratized the power of mass communication. One less laudable consequence of this development is, however, that individuals are at a much greater risk of committing defamation than existed under traditional media, which would generally exercise editorial control. The legal problems associated with defamation on social media are made more complex by the fact that through the internet in general and social media in particular communications will readily cross borders. Where a communication crosses borders, the question of the applicable law arises -whose law should govern whether the communication gives rise to an actionable claim for defamation? This is a problem which is addressed by rules of private international law, in particular through choice of law rules. This chapter examines the rules which apply in the English courts to determine which national law governs cross-border claims in defamation, considering whether a special rule should apply for online defamation, and whether the problems raised by social media require further specialized regulation. In so doing, it also analyses why the applicable rules, which were
Introduction
Social media networks have democratized the power of mass communication, an exhilarating development which challenges the control of governments and traditional media magnates over the spread of new ideas. In so doing, these new forms of communication have also (unsurprisingly) created new legal problems, perhaps most prominently in relation to cyberbullying, hate speech, and the promotion of terrorism. Another evident consequence of these developments is that individuals are at a much greater risk of committing defamation than existed under traditional media, which would generally exercise editorial control where individuals were publishing material to a wide audience. This risk is particularly strong because the general style of communication online through social media is informal and casual, and thus the impact of a communication will not necessarily be judged as lightly as it may have been intended (or hoped). 1 It is true that not all online communication is intended to be ephemeral -a much valued feature of social media is the rise in 'citizen journalism'. In general, however, there is a mis-match between the popular perception of online communications, often likened to 'chatting', and the legal perception, which is that any tweet or Facebook post is as much a publication as a traditional newspaper article. 4 Lead counsel for the claimants was John Richard Quain, a fellow of University College in London, after whom, together with his brother, the Quain professorships at UCL are named. 5 Phillips v. Eyre (n 3) 28. The claims failed because this second requirement was defeated by Eyre's immunity. 6 As the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission expressed it: the law of tort and delict was formerly seen, much more than it is today, as having a punitive rather than a compensatory function. As such it was more closely allied to criminal law, an area of the law where there is no question of a court in this country applying anything other than the domestic law of England or Scotland Joint Report of the Law Commission (No 193) in Saudi Arabia could be governed exclusively by the law of Saudi Arabia -thus, by the law of the place of the tort rather than the law of the forum. The court held that this exception should be based on whether the law of the place of the tort had the 'most significant relationship' with the claim.
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These developments left the traditional common law choice of law rule in tort in a somewhat confused position, at least when it comes to identifying the underlying principle or approach -perhaps reflecting the range of competing views about the function of tort law itself. While the starting point remains the rule of double-actionability, which suggests a combination of viewing tort as having a public regulatory function as well as being concerned with conduct regulation, flexible exceptions may point exclusively toward the law of the place of the tort or the common law of the parties, suggesting a concern with loss distribution. Which of these approaches is adopted -which principle prevails -is largely left to the courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis.
As noted above, this complex double-actionability rule continues to apply to claims for defamation brought before the English courts today, which may suggest a similar uncertainty regarding the function of defamation law. But the significance of this fact needs to be understood within a broader context, in which defamation has been specifically excluded from both UK and EU reforms to choice of law in tort. The following section discusses these reforms, and considers why it was viewed as inappropriate for them to encompass choice of law in defamation and why no alternative reformed rule has been adopted.
Reforms to choice of law in tort

Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995
The double-actionability rule provides, at least as a starting point, that English law should be applied to any tort, regardless of where in the world it was committed. It has been subject to widespread criticism as being 'chauvinist' and 'parochial'. 13 Another way of expressing this criticism is that the 'public' function of tort law, which had historically justified the application of the lex fori by analogy to criminal law, was increasingly challenged. The judicial modification of the rule through the development of a flexible exception did not do enough to address these concerns, which led finally to a 1995 UK statutory reform. As noted above, defamation was excluded from this statutory regulation (section 13). A brief explanation of the approach of the Act is still, however, helpful if we are to understand the reasons for this exclusion (discussed further in section 3.3 below).
The Act essentially established a two-stage test for determining the law applicable to a tort.
Section 11(1) established the general rule, 'that the applicable law is the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort or delict in question occur'; offering further guidance in section 11(2) on how that law should be determined where 'elements of those events occur in different countries'. Essentially, the basic rule adopted is a lex loci delicti rule -the law of the place of the tort. The second stage of the test, set out in section 12, provided for a flexible exception, under which a different law may be applied if this appears substantially more appropriate on the basis of a comparison of the connecting factors between the tort and different countries. In practice the courts have tended to use this exception principally for cases in which the relationship between the parties is centred around a different legal order.
In Edmunds v Simmonds, 14 for example, two English parties were involved in a car accident in Spain while on holiday there. The court found that English law should be applicable, emphasising that both parties were English, and that most of the damages were suffered in England.
Two key features of the 1995 Act might therefore be identified. The first is that it abandons any prioritisation of the law of the forum, and thus rejects any 'public' dimension to choice of law in tort. 15 The second is that it does not strictly decide between a conduct regulating or loss distributing approach. While the former is adopted as the most general rule, through the application of the lex loci delicti, the flexible exception allows the court to determine that a it has indeed evolved into a tort, claims for misuse of private information are likely to be covered by the Rome II Regulation exclusion, and fall within the scope of the 1995 Act.
The exclusion of defamation and privacy from the Rome II Regulation is intended to be temporary, and Article 30 (2) Although not applicable to defamation, the approach of the new general choice of law rule in tort, set out in Article 4 of the Regulation, is again worth noting. Article 4(1) specifies that a tort is generally governed by the law of the place of the tort, which is defined as the place in which direct damage is suffered. Article 4(2) specifies that this general rule is displaced in favour of the law of common habitual residence of the parties, should they have one. Finally, Article 4(3) specifies that if another law is 'manifestly more closely connected' than the law chosen under Article 4(1) or (2), which may particularly be the case where the parties have a pre-existing contractual relationship governed by a different law, then that law applies instead. The effect is a rule which combines a number of the elements and considerations examined in this chapter, not greatly dissimilar to that adopted under the 1995 Act in the United Kingdom -accepting and mediating uncertainly between the possibility of giving effect to the law of the place of the tort or the law common to the parties (or another law), but excluding any necessary role for the law of the forum, as is provided for under the traditional common law double-actionability rule.
The exclusion of defamation from statutory reform
The history examined above leaves us with a simple fact -defamation has thus far been excluded from reforms in the field of choice of law in tort, leaving it governed by a doubleactionability rule which has been widely criticised for being parochial and chauvinist. This 
A European proposal?
In May 2012, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament proposed (as an amendment to the Rome II Regulation) a new choice of law rule which would offer a clearly more sophisticated tool than the blunt double-actionability rule, providing that:
1.
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a violation of privacy or rights relating to the personality, including defamation, shall be the law of the country in which the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur.
2.
However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which the defendant is habitually resident if he or she could not reasonably have foreseen substantial consequences of his or her act occurring in the country designated by paragraph 1.
3.
Where the violation is caused by the publication of printed matter or by a broadcast, the country in which the most significant element or elements of the damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed to be the country to which the publication or broadcasting service is principally directed or, if this is not apparent, the country in which editorial control is exercised, and that country's law shall be applicable. The country to which the publication or broadcast is directed shall be determined in particular by the language of the publication or broadcast or by sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of total sales or audience size or by a combination of those factors. . 27 The significance of this point may, however, be reducing with the increased role of the European Convention on Human Rights and Charter of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on these issues. 28 It is not clear whether the damage concerned would be the entire loss or only the loss claimed in the proceedings -the latter would raise greater concerns.
extraterritorial application of the claimant's home law, and the risk that this might have a chilling effect on free speech in other jurisdictions.
For publication of printed matter or broadcast material, the place of most significant damage is presumed to be the place at which the publication was principally directed, which (if not apparent) is presumed to be the place in which editorial control is exercised. 29 The countervailing risk thus arises that print publishers or broadcasters may unduly benefit from these rules. Publishers directing their publications to more than one jurisdiction are free to establish themselves in a jurisdiction with very strong free speech protection, as it is their (favourable) home law which is presumptively applied. Alternatively, publishers directing their publications principally to a jurisdiction with very strong free speech protection may benefit from the fact that the law of principal publication governs even if a claimant suffers reputational damage through substantial publication in another place. Analysis of the European Parliament proposal thus highlights the difficult and complex balancing of interests involved in this issue -a balance which is arguably even more difficult when publication takes place online or through social media, as discussed in the following sections.
Choice of law in defamation online
This chapter now focuses its attention on the way that choice of law in defamation operates in the online context, both as a matter of current law and as a matter of possible reform. 29 The concept of a 'principally directed' broadcast has been considered in other contexts by the CJEU -see eg 
The application of the double-actionability rule
As examined above, the choice of law rule applicable for questions of defamation which arise before the English courts, including defamation online, remains the common law doubleactionability rule. Defamation online is thus a twenty first century problem which strikingly remains regulated by a nineteenth century choice of law rule. 30 This rule at least starts from the position that the governing law is both English law and the law of the place of the tort.
Fixing a territorial location to a tort is thus an essential part of applying this rule, as it would be for any lex loci delicti rule.
The case law dealing with defamation 'offline' establishes that the location of a tort of defamation, for choice of law purposes, is considered to be the place where the material is received and read. 31 In applying this rule to online communications, the courts have firmly established in a series of cases that where material is published through the internet, the tort occurs where it is 'downloaded' -that is, at the location of the reader or recipient. 32 In Standards' which 'aim to find the right balance between giving people a place to express themselves and promoting a welcoming and safe environment for everyone' 56 -replicating the function of national law rather than referring or deferring to it. 57 A prominent nongovernmental organisation focused on the rights of internet users has expressed the concern that "Facebook has become a sort of parallel justice with its own rules that we cannot fully understand." 58 Free speech on Facebook, in a practical sense, is thus regulated not principally through private law defamation claims, but through removal of content based on application of Facebook's own (somewhat unclear) quasi-administrative standards. 59 It is by no means suggested that this idea of a non-state public online realm, with its own standards of speech protection, is unproblematic. For example, if it is to be based on contractual consent then its application will be limited to situations in which the claimant and defendant to proceedings are both members of the same social media platform, within which the claimant's reputation has been damaged. Perhaps more critically, this idea would seem to constitute (or at least recognise) a potentially problematic transfer of regulatory power from the public sphere to the private. It is not self-evident that the benefits of recognising non-state community standards (such as avoiding apparently arbitrary or multiple territorial laws) outweigh the seemingly alarming consequences of the fact that this would empower corporations such as Facebook or Twitter to determine the limits of free speech on their platforms (or rather enhance the extent to which they already do so in reality), displacing norms which may be generated through more participatory and democratic processes. 60 One concern is that the rules on a social media platform or their enforcement could readily become politicised, although it must also be remembered that national law control over social media does not in any way guarantee its depoliticisation -as events in Russia in relation to VKontakte (Russia's most popular social media platform) may appear to suggest. 61 Given this range of concerns, this chapter does not advocate the recognition of non-state norms to govern cross-border defamation in place of national laws, let alone claim that existing positive law quite allows for this type of analysis. But non-state private regulation of social media is already taking place far more commonly and effectively than regulation by national law and institutions, and lawyers and legal academics ignore such realities at their peril. The problems and the example discussed above highlight that the issues posed by crossborder defamation on social media are deeper than merely practical problems -they are potentially problems which challenge our very idea of a political community within which a reputation may exist and speech may be regulated, and they are worth taking seriously.
Conclusions
As choice of law in tort has developed through UK statutory reform and European harmonisation, choice of law in defamation has been left behind, continuing to be subject to the traditional common law double-actionability rule. In part this is because there remain doubts about the appropriateness of adopting any rule which approaches choice of law in defamation purely as a matter of private law, without recognising the important public significance of the regulation of free speech in a political community. In part it is also because agreeing on any new rule has proven extremely difficult. Even offline, adopting any
